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Abstract 
We study the pricing and welfare implications of changing the VAT status of the national postal 
operator (NPO) from exempt to rated. We build a model where the NPO offers both single-piece 
and bulk mail to customers, some of them VAT rated, others VAT exempt. We solve for the optimal 
Ramsey prices under monopoly and under access-based competition for bulk mail. We finally 
perform numerical simulations in order to determine how prices, volumes and welfare might be 
affected by the change in the NPO’s VAT status, both under monopoly and under access-based 
competition for bulk mail. 
1 Introduction  
Within the European Union, the application of value added tax on postal services is a 
matter for the government of the member state. The state is required under the European 
Directive to ensure the provision of the universal postal service. The incumbent national 
postal operator faces universal service obligations including the daily collection and 
delivery of mail throughout the state with, in most cases, geographically uniform tariffs. In 
most countries, the incumbent national postal operator has been a monopolist, owned by 
the government and exempt from value added tax for the provision of the postal services. 
In some countries within Europe, the postal market has been opened up to competition so 
that the national postal operator is no longer a monopolist of postal services within the 
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state and in some countries the national postal operator has transferred from public to 
private ownership. The application of value added tax for postal services in the presence of 
such change is important in understanding the development of the postal markets in 
Europe.1  
The application of value added tax (VAT) is of interest because either the postal 
operator or customer may be VAT exempt or VAT rated. For the postal operator, if it is 
exempt from charging VAT on postal services it is unable to recover VAT they pay on 
inputs so these unrecovered tax payments enter their cost base in forming the prices of 
their postal services. On the other hand, if a postal operator is required to charge VAT on 
the postal services they offer, which is generally the case for postal operators other than the 
national postal operator, then they are rated for VAT purposes and are able to recover input 
tax. A similar distinction holds for the customers of postal services, some of them being 
VAT exempt (such as financial services and insurance firms in the UK) while others are 
VAT rated. Tax incidence and prices then differ depending on whether the postal operator 
and customer is VAT exempt or VAT rated. For instance, extending a VAT exemption to 
the national postal operator but not to its competitors may give to the former a pricing 
advantage when dealing with VAT exempt customers, and a disadvantage when dealing 
with VAT rated customers. 
In this paper, we explore some of the issues relating to the application of value added 
tax under alternative objective functions, initially where the incumbent is a monopolist and 
then where it operates in a market that is open to competition in the provision of some 
upstream services, through entrants accessing the incumbent’s downstream services. In 
addition to the tax incidence and prices, we also consider the welfare implications of these 
various cases. In our model, the national operator offers two end-to-end (E2E) products: a 
single-piece product and a business mail product. The business mail product is offered to 
both VAT rated and VAT exempt customers. The entrants, when introduced, act as a 
competitive fringe offering a bulk mail product that is an (imperfect) substitute to the bulk 
mail offered by the national operator. The national operator also sells access to its delivery 
areas to the entrants, thereby selling an intermediate good as well as the two end-to-end 
products. While the national operator is either VAT rated or VAT exempt, the entrants are 
assumed to be VAT rated throughout. As such, the model for this paper develops that of 
De Donder et al (2006) to explore the issues of value added tax within postal services. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper looking at the implications of the change 
in VAT status of operators in the postal market using an analytical model.2 
The paper proceeds as follows. Our model is set out further in section 2, first for the 
monopoly case and then when bulk mail is opened to competition. In this section, we 
provide analytically the optimal Ramsey pricing formulas for the national operator. In 
                                                 
1 The postal sector is unusual in that it is the only network industry for which the 2006 VAT Directive 
mentions (in its Article 132) a “public service exemption” for VAT for the national operator. The other two 
public service exemptions are hospital services “by bodies governed by public laws, or under social 
conditions comparable with these”, and old people’s homes “by bodies governed by public laws or 
recognized as being devoted to social wellbeing”. 
2 See Auerbach and Hines (2001) for a general presentation of the economic impact of value added taxation. 
De Donder et al (2009) builds on the analytical framework developed in this paper and is exclusively 
numerical. This sequel uses the same calibration assumptions as used here and extends the numerical 
simulations performed in the second part of the current paper to the cases where the entrants bypass the 
incumbent’s delivery network and where different VAT rates are charged on different postal goods. We 
come back to this paper in the concluding section. 
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order to assess the impact of the VAT status of this operator on volumes and welfare, we 
then calibrate the model in Section 3. Section 4 presents, for the monopolist and 
competition cases, some numerical results for the second best welfare maximizing case 
and, by contrast, a case with the minimum single-piece price that enables the national 
operator to break-even. Section 5 concludes. 
2 The model 
We first describe the model when the national postal operator (NPO) has a monopoly 
before moving to the case where it faces competition on the bulk mail market. 
2.1 Monopoly 
We start the analysis with a single NPO (variables denoted with the superscript I ) that 
offers both single-piece mail (whose quantity is denoted by x ) and bulk mail (whose 
quantity is denoted by Iy ) to a single delivery area. We denote by q  the before-tax price 
of single-piece mail and by Ip  the before-tax price of bulk mail. There is a single VAT 
rate paid on all goods (non-labor inputs and outputs) which is denoted by t . We will 
consider both the case where the NPO is VAT exempt and where it is VAT rated. 
The demand for single-piece mail is assumed to be independent from the demand for 
bulk mail.3 All customers of single-piece mail are VAT exempt.4 In the case where the 
NPO is also VAT exempt, their demand for single-piece mail is given by ( )x q . If the NPO 
is VAT rated, their demand is ( (1 ))x q t+ . We distinguish two kinds of bulk mail 
customers: those who are VAT rated (denoted with subscript R ) and those who are not 
(subscript N ). VAT exempt buyers care about the after-tax price of the good while the 
VAT rated ones care about the before-tax price (because they reclaim the VAT they pay on 
this good, which is an input in their own production process). The postal operator charges 
the same before-tax price Ip  to the two types of customers.5 The total demand for NPO 
bulk mail is given by  
 
( ) = ( ) ( (1 ))I I I I I IR Ny p y p y p t+ +  
 
if the NPO is VAT rated, and by  
( ) = ( ) ( )I I I I I IR Ny p y p y p+  
 
if not. 
                                                 
3 This assumption is reasonable provided that the difference between single-piece mail price and bulk mail 
price is at least equal to the preparation cost that bulk mail users have to incur. Since this constraint is not 
binding in all Ramsey problems studied in section 4, we do not formally introduce it in the equations below. 
4 In the main, customers of single-piece mail are households which by definition do not sell goods and 
services and so neither charge VAT nor reclaim input tax; or they are small businesses whose level of 
business turnover is below that at which they are required to levy VAT and so again neither charge the tax 
nor are able to recover input tax. 
5 This may be due to the unobservability of the tax status of customers, to transaction costs in implementing 
different prices, or to a mandate imposed by a regulator. 
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The NPO faces three kinds of costs: fixed costs, upstream costs and delivery costs. The 
fixed cost is denoted by F , with a fraction Fα  that is non-labor costs – that is, on which 
the NPO pays VAT. This fixed cost reflects the fact that the NPO is subject to a universal 
service obligation which, among other things, necessitates the building of a delivery 
network providing daily services to the totality of the country. We denote by xc  
(respectively, Iyc ) the constant marginal upstream cost for single-piece mail (respectively, 
bulk mail), and we assume that > .Ix yc c  We denote by 
Id  the constant marginal delivery 
cost for both single-piece and bulk mail. Finally, Iα  denotes the fraction of the upstream 
and delivery costs that is non-labor – that is, on which the NPO pays VAT. 
The costs faced by the NPO depend on its VAT status. The NPO pays VAT on its non-
labor inputs whatever its VAT status. If the NPO is VAT exempt, it does not charge VAT 
to its customers and can not reclaim the VAT paid on inputs. If the NPO is VAT rated, it 
charges VAT to its customers and reclaims the VAT it has paid on inputs. In the case the 
NPO is VAT exempt (denoted with a subscript N ), its cost of providing x  units of single-
piece mail and Iy  units of bulk mail is denoted by 
 ( )( , ) = (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )I I I I I IN F x yC x y F t t c d x c d yα α+ + + + + +  
 
where FtFα  is a fixed amount of VAT paid by the NPO irrespective of its volume of 
output of postal services while 
 ( )( ) ( )I I I I Ix yt c d x c d yα + + +  
 
measures the variable part of VAT the NPO pays. 
On the other hand, if the NPO is VAT rated, it can recoup the VAT paid on inputs, and 
its cost function is given by 
 
( , ) = ( ) ( ) .I I I I IR x yC x y F c d x c d y+ + + +  
 
We obviously have that  
 
( , ) > ( , ).I IN RC x y C x y  
 
The (net of tax) NPO’s profit is given by  
 
( , ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ))I I I I I I I IN R N Nq p qx q p y p y p C x q y p⎡ ⎤Π + + −⎣ ⎦  
 
if the NPO is VAT exempt and 
 
( , ) = ( (1 )) ( ) ( (1 ))
( ( (1 )), ( ) ( (1 )))
I I I I I I
R R N
I I I I
R R N
q p qx q t p y p y p t
C x q t y p y p t
⎡ ⎤Π + + + +⎣ ⎦
− + + +
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if it is VAT rated. This illustrates the impact on the NPO’s profit of changing its VAT 
status from exempt to rated, while keeping before-tax prices constant. On the output side, 
this move decreases the amount demanded by single-piece buyers (who are all VAT 
exempt) and by VAT exempt bulk mail customers (the other bulk mail customers are not 
affected since they reclaim the VAT they pay on inputs). This impact on profit is thus 
negative. On the input side, the NPO can now reclaim the VAT it is paying on inputs. This 
impact on profit is positive. The sign of the net impact is ambiguous and depends on 
demand elasticities: if the demand by VAT exempt customers were totally inelastic, the 
first impact would disappear and the net effect would be positive. The larger the demand 
elasticity of those customers, the lower ( , ) ( , )I IR Nq p q pΠ −Π , for given prices q  and Ip . 
2.1.1 Optimal pricing formulas with VAT exempt NPO 
We first study a Ramsey-type objective for the social planner, who maximizes total welfare 
in the postal economy subject to the NPO breaking even. Total welfare is made up of 
consumer surplus, NPO’s profit and VAT proceeds raised in the postal sector. We assume 
that the planner values the VAT proceeds using an exogenous cost of public funds, denoted 
by μ . With a VAT exempt NPO, the optimization problem is  
 
(1)  ,
max = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
such that ( , ) 0,
M M I M I I M I
N x N R N NIq p
I
N
W CS q CS p CS p q p VAT q p
q p
μ+ + + Π + +
Π ≥
 
 
where ( )xCS q  measures the net consumer surplus of single-piece mail buyers and (.)
M
NCS  
(respectively, (.)MRCS ) measures the net consumer surplus of the VAT exempt 
(respectively, VAT rated) bulk mail buyers. The parameter λ  is the Lagrange multiplier of 
the NPO budget constraint and measures the shadow cost of this constraint in terms of 
social welfare MNW . 
When the NPO is VAT exempt, the amount of VAT proceeds in the postal sector is 
given by 
 
( )( , ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .M I I I I I I I I IN F x y N RVAT q p t F t c d x q c d y p y pα α ⎡ ⎤+ + + + +⎣ ⎦  
 
The FOC with respect to q  is given by the Ramsey-like formula 
 
(2) 
(1 )( )
11 = ,
1
I I
x
x
q t c d
q
λ μ α λλ
λ ε
−⎡ ⎤− + +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
+  
 
where xε denotes the (absolute value of the) demand price elasticity of single-piece mail. 
The reader will recognize the Ramsey rule, with the mark-up over marginal cost inversely 
proportional to the price elasticity of demand. Formula (2) differs from the traditional 
Ramsey rule in that it makes use of a modified marginal cost of the firm (the term in 
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brackets) rather than the effective marginal cost for society, Ixc d+ . This formulation 
conforms to intuition, since the NPO does not charge VAT on single-piece mail (so that 
consumer and producer prices of this good are the same) but pays VAT on its inputs (so 
that VAT affects the NPO’s costs). Other things equal, a larger value of μ  decreases this 
modified marginal cost of the firm and thus calls for a lower value of q . The intuition is 
straightforward: a planner putting more weight on tax proceeds (a higher μ ) is induced to 
lower the price in order to increase volumes and generate more VAT proceeds when the 
NPO buys its inputs. If μ =-1, the planner does not take into account tax proceeds and the 
relevant marginal cost is the after-tax one for the firm. If μ =0 (zero cost of public funds), 
the tax part of the marginal cost is deflated by /(1 )λ λ+ . If λ μ= , the relevant marginal 
cost is the before-tax one, Ixc d+ , as the concerns for the NPO breaking even and the cost 
of public funds neutralize each other. We then get back to the classical Ramsey 
formulation when λ μ= . As usual, a larger value of λ  is associated with a larger value of 
the equilibrium price q . 
The FOC for the bulk mail price is obtained similarly: 
 
(3)  
(1 )( )
11 = ,
1
I I I I
y
I
y
p t c d
p
λ μ α λλ
λ ε
−⎡ ⎤− + +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
+  
 
where yε  denotes the direct price elasticity of (total) bulk mail demand ( )I Iy p . 
2.1.2 Optimal pricing formulas with VAT rated NPO 
When the NPO is VAT rated, the planner’s objective is given by 
 
(4)  
,
max = ( (1 )) ( (1 )) ( )
( , ) (1 ) ( , )
such that ( , ) 0,
M M I M I
R x N RIq p
I M I
R R
I
R
W CS q t CS p t CS p
q p VAT q p
q p
μ
+ + + +
+ Π + +
Π ≥
 
 
with λ denoting the Lagrange multiplier of the profit constraint. Now that the NPO is 
VAT rated, both single-piece mail customers and a fraction of bulk mail customers (those 
who are not rated) pay VAT. As for VAT rated buyers of bulk mail, they do not pay VAT 
themselves but rather charge VAT to their final customers. We make the simplifying 
assumption that the final amount of VAT paid by their final customers is not affected by 
the bulk mail price they pay.6 We then have that 
 
                                                 
6 This is the case for instance if postal services represent a small fraction of the inputs of bulk mail buyers, so 
that their own output price is not affected significantly by variations in bulk mail price. The alternative to this 
simplifying assumption would require us to model the demand function for the final goods and services sold 
by VAT rated buyers of bulk mail. This would complicate the model and introduce a further set of 
assumptions related to these demand functions. 
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(5)  ( , ) = ( (1 )) ( (1 )) .M I I I IR NVAT q p t qx q t p y p t⎡ ⎤+ + +⎣ ⎦  
 
The FOC with respect to q  is then given by  
 
(6)  
11 ( )
11 = .
1
I
x
x
q t c d
t
q
μ
λ μλ
λ ε
+⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟ ++⎝ ⎠
+  
 
Unlike (2), the Ramsey rule is expressed here in terms of the difference between a 
modified price and the resource cost for society. This formulation conforms to intuition, 
since the NPO charges VAT on single-piece mail (so that consumer and producer prices of 
this good differ) but recoups VAT on its inputs (so that VAT does not affect directly the 
NPO’s costs). The impact of μ  on the optimal value of q  is more complex than when the 
NPO is VAT exempt, since μ  is present both on the left-hand side and on the right-hand 
side of (6), with opposite impacts on the optimal value of q . This is because VAT 
proceeds are obtained from taxing single-piece mail sales revenues, and not from taxing 
inputs. With a VAT exempt NPO, tax proceeds are always decreasing in q , since a higher 
price decreases both the volume and the value of the inputs bought by the NPO. When the 
NPO is VAT rated, an increase in q  does not always decrease VAT proceeds, since the 
value of sales may increase even if their volume decreases. On the other hand, increasing 
λ  is as usual associated with a larger optimal value of q . Observe that, in the special case 
where =λ μ , equation (6) simplifies to the classical Ramsey formula in terms of after-tax 
price (1 ).q t+  We obtained a similar result (but in terms of before-tax price q ) in the case 
where the NPO is VAT exempt. 
The FOC with respect to Ip  is more complex:  
 
(7)  
(.)(.) (1 )( ( ))
(.)1( ) (.) (1 )(1 )( (1 ) ( ))
1
= 0.
I
I I I I R
R y I
I
I I I I N
N y I
yy p c d
p
yt y t p c d
p
λ λ
μλ μ λ λ
∂+ + − + ∂
∂++ + + + + + − ++ ∂  
 
The complexity of the formula is due to the fact that a single price, Ip , affects the bulk 
mail demand coming both from VAT rated and from VAT exempt customers, with 
different consequences on VAT proceeds. The first line in (7) denotes the impact on 
welfare through variations in the VAT rated market while the second line represents the 
impact in the VAT exempt market. If the NPO were able and allowed to post different 
prices on these two markets, say IRp  and 
I
Np , the optimal price formula on the VAT rated 
market would be  
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(8)  
( ) 1= ,
1
I I I
R y
I
R R
p c d
p
λ
λ ε
− +
+  
 
while the price formula in the VAT exempt market would be 
 
(9)  
11 ( )
11 = ,
1
I I I
N y
I
N N
p t c d
t
p
μ
λ μλ
λ ε
+⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟ ++⎝ ⎠
+  
 
with iε  the direct price elasticity of bulk mail demand among VAT rated customers 
( =i R ) and VAT exempt customers ( =i N ). 
The optimal price in the VAT rated market is given by the usual Ramsey formula (8). 
The cost of public funds does not play any role, since IRp  does not affect the VAT 
proceeds as given by (5). The optimal price formula in the VAT exempt market is similar 
to the corresponding formula for the single-piece mail product, given by (6). 
Since we assume that the same price has to be posted on both markets, the optimal 
pricing formula is given by the more complex equation (7). 
In each case (NPO VAT rated or not), the Ramsey optimization program generates a 
pair of prices ( , )Iq p  that are consistent with the NPO breaking-even. There of course 
exist other pairs of prices consistent with the NPO breaking-even. Among these pairs, a 
particularly interesting one corresponds to the minimum value of the single-piece mail 
price. Indeed, one can make the point that regulators tend to care a lot about the value of 
this price since it is the most visible to citizens/voters (see Panzar (2004)). The problem the 
planner solves in that case is to find7  
 
(10)  min   such that ( , ) 0, = , .Iiq q p i N RΠ ≥  
2.2 Competition with access only 
We now enrich our analysis by introducing entrants (denoted by E ) that compete with the 
NPO by offering a bulk mail product to both VAT rated and VAT exempt customers. The 
bulk mail product offered by entrants is an (imperfect) substitute to the good provided by 
the NPO. The entrants are VAT rated: they charge VAT to customers and reclaim any 
VAT they pay on inputs. The quantity of bulk mail sold by entrants is denoted by Ey . As 
we have seen with the NPO monopolist, the demand by VAT rated customers depends on 
before-tax prices. Denoting the entrants’s before-tax price for bulk mail by Ep , we have 
that the demand by VAT rated customers for NPO (respectively, entrants’) bulk mail is 
given by ( , )I I ERy p p  (respectively, ( , )
E I E
Ry p p ). The demands by VAT exempt customers 
                                                 
7 As explained in footnote 3, we also impose the constraint that Iq p k≥ + , where k  represents the 
preparation cost borne by all users of bulk mail. Unlike for the Ramsey formulas studied above, this 
constraint is binding for the formulation (10) with our calibration assumptions. 
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depends on after-tax prices. Assuming that the NPO is VAT exempt, we have demand 
functions ( , (1 ))I I ENy p p t+  and ( , (1 ))E I ENy p p t+ . In the case where the NPO is also VAT 
rated, like the entrant, the demands are given by ( (1 ), (1 ))I I ENy p t p t+ +  and 
( (1 ), (1 ))E I ENy p t p t+ + . Total demand for NPO (respectively, entrants’) bulk mail is 
denoted by ( , )I I Ey p p  (respectively, by ( , )E I Ey p p ). 
To summarize, we have that, if the NPO is VAT exempt,  
 
( , ) = ( , ) ( , (1 )),
( , ) = ( , ) ( , (1 )),
I I E I I E I I E
R N
E I E E I E E I E
R N
y p p y p p y p p t
y p p y p p y p p t
+ +
+ +  
 
while, if the NPO is VAT rated, we have  
 
( , ) = ( , ) ( (1 ), (1 )),
( , ) = ( , ) ( (1 ), (1 )).
I I E I I E I I E
R N
E I E E I E E I E
R N
y p p y p p y p t p t
y p p y p p y p t p t
+ + +
+ + +  
 
As for costs, we assume that entrants have no fixed cost,8 a constant marginal upstream 
cost of Ec  and are obliged to buy access to the NPO delivery network at a constant (net of 
tax) unit cost (access charge) of a . One unit of bulk mail necessitates one unit of access. 
We assume that entrants behave like a competitive fringe. The before-tax price charged 
by entrants is then 
 
= .E Ep a c+  
 
Whether the NPO is VAT exempt has no direct impact on this price formula since 
entrants behave like a competitive fringe, and since the “true” marginal cost of a VAT 
rated entrant is not affected by whether the entrant has paid VAT on (part of) its inputs. 
In the Appendix, we present an extended analytical study of this model. In particular, 
we provide the expressions for the optimal second-best prices of the NPO when it is VAT 
exempt and when it is VAT rated. We summarize here the main results obtained. First, the 
formulas for the optimal single-piece price are not affected by the presence of entrants on 
the bulk mail markets, and are still given by equation (2) if the NPO is VAT exempt and 
by (6) if it is VAT rated. Although the formulas are the same, the optimal value of q  will 
typically differ because the equilibrium value of λ  differs. In order to assess whether the 
optimal single-piece price is lower or higher in the presence of bulk mail competition, we 
will have to resort to numerical simulations. 
Second, we now have two types of prices to determine in the bulk mail market: Ip  and 
a  – that is, the prices of both the final good and the intermediate good sold by the NPO. 
The optimality formulas for these two prices are closely linked, with one optimal price 
depending upon the other, as is usual in the literature (see Armstrong (2002) and De 
Donder (2006)). Third, the optimal prices when the NPO is VAT rated are especially 
                                                 
8 The absence of fixed cost is due to the fact that entrants, unlike the NPO, are not subject to a universal 
service obligation. In the calibrations, we assume that the absence of fixed costs for entrants translates into 
higher marginal (upstream and delivery) costs than for the NPO. 
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complex because they take into account both VAT rated and VAT exempt customers. To 
simplify these formulations, we assume as in the previous section that the NPO can charge 
prices that vary according to the VAT status of the customer. Observe that this is also the 
case for the access charge even when the NPO is VAT exempt, because access is sold to 
VAT rated entrants whose clientele encompasses both VAT rated and VAT exempt 
customers. 
In the case where the NPO is VAT rated and where its final customers are VAT rated, 
the optimal price formulas correspond exactly to those developed in the literature. In other 
words, as in section 2.1.2 above, the VAT rate t  and the cost of public funds μ  have no 
impact on optimal prices. In the other cases, the optimality formulas are much more 
complex. We analyze them in the Appendix and we show how the optimal bulk mail 
pricing formulas differ from their monopoly counterparts. The main picture that emerges is 
that the adjustments to be made to optimal formulas to take account of changes in VAT 
status resemble those made in the monopoly case. 
First-order conditions give us important insights regarding the determinants of optimal 
prices. In order to go beyond and focus on price levels (as opposed to pricing rules), 
quantities and welfare levels, we have to calibrate our model and to run numerical 
simulations. These simulations allow us to look at several dimensions. First, they allow us 
to study the tax incidence effects of changes in the VAT status of the NPO, by determining 
how pre- and post-tax prices are affected by these changes. More generally, they allow us 
to identify potential impacts on economic welfare and its distribution from a change in 
VAT status, and to check whether our results are robust to the introduction of access-based 
bulk mail competition. Finally, they allow to compare the results obtained with different 
objectives (such as the minimization of the single-piece price, or the second best objective 
discussed above), for any given VAT status of the NPO and market conditions. We now 
turn to the calibration of the model. 
3 Calibration 
Our calibration assumptions are the same as in De Donder et al (2006), but without 
distinction between delivery zones. Note that, as in that paper, the assumptions used here 
do not represent the position in a particular NPO. Rather they are stylized and applied to 
illustrate the effects within the model given the complexity of analytical solutions to the 
formal model set out in section 2. We start from the hypothetical situation where the VAT 
exempt NPO does not face any entrants and posts a price of 0.50 for the single-piece 
product and 0.40 for its bulk mail product. Total quantities sold at those prices are, 
respectively, 2 billion and 8 billion items. We assume that VAT rated and VAT exempt 
consumers have the same demand function  
 
( ) = ( ),I I I IR Ny p y p  
 
so that they both demand 4 billion items for a 0.40 bulk mail price. The direct price 
elasticities are -0.2 for single-piece mail and -0.4 for bulk mail at these prices. Finally, we 
calibrate linear demands based on these quantities, prices and elasticities. 
We need further information to calibrate the demand functions for bulk mail products 
when the market is opened to competition. We use two types of information: the extent of 
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entry for different price configurations and the substitutability between the two bulk mail 
products for consumers. We assume that entrants would capture 10% of the total market 
for bulk mail if both bulk mail products had the same price and 50% of the market if 
entrants were to offer a 20% price discount over the NPO. As for substitution between 
those products, we assume that the displacement ratio is set at 0.75 which means that three 
quarters of the quantities sold by entrants are displaced from the NPO, while one quarter 
represents additional volumes sold in the sector. We make the same assumptions for bulk 
mail demand emanating from VAT rated and VAT exempt customers. 
The NPO constant marginal upstream cost (before tax) is = 0.173xc  for single-piece 
mail9 and = 0.115Iyc  for bulk mail. The NPO constant marginal delivery cost (for all kinds 
of mail), Id  is 0.116 . The share of fixed cost that is non-labor is = 0.4Fα  while the 
corresponding fraction for variable costs is = 0.2.Iα  The VAT rate t  is 20%. The (before 
tax) fixed cost F  equals 1.556bn  so that the PO breaks even in the hypothetical monopoly 
situation ( F  equals 40% of revenue of 4.2bn). An entrant does not face any fixed cost but 
we assume that this results in higher variable upstream and delivery costs than the NPO. 
Accordingly, an entrant’s before tax upstream cost, Ec , is set at 0.144 , its delivery cost at 
0.183 . The preparation cost k  borne by all users of bulk mail is set at 0.06   
4 Numerical results 
We first look at the monopoly case before turning to the simulations with access-based 
competition for the bulk mail product. 
4.1 Monopoly 
Table 1 shows the results of the monopolist NPO. The first three columns of figures relate 
to the VAT exempt monopolist. The first column shows the calibration used. With no VAT 
applied to the NPO the pre and post-tax prices are the same, at 0.50 for the single-piece 
and 0.40 for the bulk mail piece. The calibration assumptions correspond to the equi-
proportional mark-up (EPMU) solution, with the same mark-up over marginal cost posted 
for both the single-piece mail and bulk mail. For these prices, 80% of volumes are bulk 
mail (40% from VAT exempt customers and 40% for VAT rated ones), and the remaining 
20% is single-piece mail. Given the stylized assumptions used in the calibration set out in 
section 3, around 28% of the NPO’s costs are subject to VAT (this is a weighted average 
of the percentage of non-labor fixed costs, 40%, and of non-labor variable costs, 20%). No 
VAT is paid by customers and the NPO pays VAT of 0.221bn through its input costs. Total 
consumer surplus is 6.500bn, while the NPO’s profit equals zero by construction. The last 
row in the Table gives the value of the objective, total welfare – that is, the sum of 
customer surplus, NPO’s profit and of (1 )μ+  times VAT proceeds, with = 0.3μ  being 
the exogenous cost of public funds.10 This equals 6.788bn in the calibrated simulation. 
 
 VAT exempt NPO VAT rated NPO 
                                                 
9 This value corresponds to an after-tax cost of 0.18 (the value used in De Donder et al (2006)) once a 
( t =20%) VAT rate has been imposed on the ( =Iα 20%) fraction of the upstream cost that is non-labor. 
10 Most estimates of the cost of public funds, in developed countries are in the range of 0.2 to 0.3. 
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 Calibration Welfare 
maximizing 
Min q Calibration – 
scaled down 
Welfare 
maximizing 
Min q 
Single-piece  (λ=0.15)   (λ=0.19)  
Pre-VAT 
price 
0.500 0.615 0.469 0.478 0.573 0.450 
Post-VAT 
price 
0.500 0.615 0.469 0.574 0.688 0.540 
Volume 2.000 1.908 2.025 1.941 1.850 1.968 
       
Bulk mail        
Pre-VAT 
price 
0.400 0.371 0.409 0.382 0.359 0.390 
Post-VAT 
price 
0.400 0.371 0.409 0.459 0.430 0.468 
Volume N11 4.000 4.116 3.965 3.765 3.878 3.728 
Volume R12 4.000 4.116 3.965 4.071 4.165 4.040 
       
Net VAT 
receipts 
0.221 0.221 0.222 0.566 0.569 0.564 
Total 
consumer 
surplus13 
6.500 6.510 6.493 6.198 6.187 6.197 
Welfare 6.788 6.799 6.780 6.813 6.825 6.805 
Table 1: Allocations with the monopolist NPO14 
The second best welfare maximizing results corresponding to program (1) are shown in 
the second column of figures. The value of the Lagrange multiplier of the break-even 
constraint, λ , is lower than the exogenous value of the cost of public funds, μ . Demand 
elasticity is larger for bulk mail than for single-piece mail, so that Ramsey prices under 
program (1) are lower than EPMU for the first category of mail, and larger for the second. 
The single-piece price (given by equation (2)) increases to 0.615, and its demand reduces 
from 2.00bn items to 1.908bn. The bulk mail price (given by equation (3)) reduces from 
0.40 to 0.371, and its demand increases from 8.00bn to 8.25bn items. The NPO pays VAT 
of 0.221bn through its input costs. Single-piece customers’ surplus decreases (compared to 
the calibration allocation), while bulk mail customers’ surplus increases. As expected from 
the comparative nature of the two programs, the weighted sum of customers’ surpluses and 
VAT proceeds increases (since this is what is maximized in this simulation) but only 
slightly. Observe that total customers’ surplus is also slightly higher than in the calibration 
simulation. 
The third column reports the solution of optimization problem (10). Observe that the 
constraint that Ip q k≤ − , with = 0.06k , is binding. The minimum single-piece mail price 
decreases to 0.469, and its demand increases to 2.025bn. The bulk mail price increases to 
                                                 
11 N = non VAT rated or VAT exempt customers  
12 R = VAT rated customers 
13 NPO’s profit is zero by construction in all scenarios considered. 
14 Prices are expressed in €, volumes in billion items, VAT receipts, surplus and welfare in billion euros. 
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0.409 – consistent with a minimum margin of 0.06 between the bulk mail and single-piece 
price – to recover the shortfall from the lower single-piece price; the bulk mail demand 
reduces to 7.93bn items, split equally between (VAT rated) R  and (VAT exempt) N  
customers. The NPO pays VAT of 0.222bn through its input costs, total consumer surplus 
reduces to 6.493bn  and the total welfare reduces to 6.78bn. The welfare is marginally 
lower in this case as the single-piece price is set to a minimum value and results in the bulk 
mail price increasing to reach break-even. 
The break-even results involve a range of single-piece prices between 0.469 and 0.615. 
However, no VAT is charged on these prices, nor the bulk mail prices. VAT is only 
charged on the input to the NPO. As the combined volumes do not change substantially, 
the VAT and welfare are reasonably stable over the break-even range of cases. 
The final three columns of figures in Table 1 relate to the VAT rated monopolist. Here 
the NPO charges VAT at an assumed rate of 20% on its services and reclaims the VAT it 
pays on its inputs. Comparing these three columns with the first three allows us to obtain 
the impact of changing the VAT status of the NPO from exempt to rated under three 
different pricing rules. At the (pre-tax) calibration prices of 0.5 for single-piece and 0.4 for 
bulk mail, the net impact for the NPO’s profit of moving to a VAT rated status (as 
discussed in section 2.1.) is positive. In order to compare with the other columns of Table 1 
(all of which have the NPO breaking even), we report in the first of the last three columns 
the results obtained when we scale down both pre-tax prices by the same percentage 
compared to the calibrated values reported in the first numerical column. In this case, the 
post-VAT prices for the single-piece item is higher at 0.574 and bulk mail at 0.459 for N  
customers, having applied VAT at a rate of 20%. However, for R  customers the effective 
bulk mail price decreases to 0.382 as those customers can reclaim the VAT applied to the 
price. Where the prices paid increase the demand reduces – to 1.94bn items for single-
piece and from 4.00bn to 3.76bn items for VAT exempt bulk mail customers. Volumes 
increase from 4.00bn to 4.07bn for VAT rated customers of bulk mail. The reduction in 
total volume reduces the NPO’s input VAT but this is more than offset by the VAT 
recovered through prices to yield net VAT receipts of 0.566bn. Relative to the calibration 
in the first column of Table 1, total customer surplus is much lower. The increase in 
(weighted) VAT receipts more than compensates for the loss in total consumer surplus 
within the calibration. 
The second best welfare maximizing result for the VAT rated monopolist is shown in 
the fifth column of Table 1 and may be compared to the VAT exempt monopolist in the 
second column. The post-VAT single-piece price of the VAT rated NPO at 0.688  is 12% 
more than the single-piece price of the VAT exempt NPO of 0.615 – the single-piece price 
increases less than the VAT rate of 20%. In other words, just over 60% of the tax is borne 
by consumers in the form of a higher after-tax price. 
The combined effect of the tax on both types of bulk mail customers jointly is that less 
of the tax is shifted forward to bulk mail customers overall than in the case of single-piece 
customers. This is in line with economic theory in that, in a perfectly competitive 
economy, the higher the elasticity of demand, the smaller the fraction of a tax on 
transactions that is borne by customers. However, the position is complicated by the 
different tax status of the two classes of bulk mail customers, those that are VAT rated and 
those that are not, which results from them facing , inclusive of the tax, significantly 
different effective prices for bulk mail. VAT rated customers, although charged the tax, 
actually face lower prices than without the tax (by 3% from 0.371 to 0.359). This unusual 
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situation arises inter alia because, first, the cost base of the NPO is lowered by its ability to 
reclaim input tax so helping to lower the pre-tax price and, secondly, that a VAT rated bulk 
mail customer itself can reclaim as input tax the VAT levied by the NPO. By contrast, for 
VAT exempt bulk mail customers the post-VAT bulk mail price of the VAT rated NPO at 
0.430 is 16% more than the bulk mail price of the VAT exempt NPO of 0.371. A larger 
percentage of the tax (80%) is borne by N  consumers of bulk mail than by ( N ) 
consumers of single-piece mail. But the weighted average across both types of bulk mail 
customers is just over 30%, less than single-piece customers. 
Comparison of the second and fifth columns of Table 1 also shows that the total 
consumer surplus of the VAT exempt NPO at 6.510bn is significantly higher than that for 
the VAT rated NPO of 6.187bn. At the calibration values set out in section 3, this means 
that VAT rated bulk mail customers gain less than VAT exempt customers lose from the 
change of VAT status of the NPO (both single-piece and bulk mail exempt customers 
lose). However, when VAT receipts are added to the total consumer surplus and profit and 
multiplied by 1.3 to reflect social welfare, the welfare of the VAT exempt NPO at 6.799bn 
is marginally less than that for the VAT rated NPO of 6.825bn. Under such assumptions, 
the movement from a VAT exempt to VAT rated NPO would reduce the economic welfare 
of postal consumers, but within the model framework this would be offset by the VAT 
receipts to the VAT authority such that the welfare would be very marginally more in the 
case of the VAT rated NPO for society as a whole at the cost of public funds assumed of 
0.3. Finally, the Lagrange multiplier of the NPO’s zero-profit constraint is larger when the 
NPO is VAT rated, but remains smaller than the exogenous cost of public funds. 
Moving to the minimum single-piece mail price consistent with the NPO breaking 
even, and comparing the third and sixth columns of Table 1, we obtain a second tax 
incidence result, with roughly 75% of the 20% VAT rate borne directly by single-piece 
mail consumers in the form of a higher after-tax price. Note that the NPO can break-even 
with smaller pre-tax prices when VAT rated because then it would be able, under the 
alternative tax regime, to recover input tax. As they care only about pre-tax prices, VAT 
rated customers benefit from this move, while VAT exempt customers suffer from higher 
after-tax prices. Total surplus is lower than in the third column of Table 1, but the sum of 
surplus and of weighted VAT proceeds is larger than in the third column of Table 1. 
We now summarize the main impacts from our model of changing the VAT status of 
the monopoly NPO from exempt to rated at the calibration values set out in section 3. 
 
Result 11 A move from VAT exempt to VAT rated increases the monopoly NPO’s profit if 
pre-tax prices stay at their calibration level. For the three pricing rules we have studied 
(equi-proportional mark-up, Ramsey and minimum single-piece mail price), moving the 
NPO’s VAT status from exempt to rated has the same qualitative impact: VAT exempt 
customers lose (because of higher after-tax prices) while VAT rated customers benefit 
(from lower pre-tax prices). In terms of tax incidence, as expected from economic theory, 
only part of the tax is shifted forward to customers. Total customers’ surpluses decrease 
(that is, VAT exempt customers lose more than VAT rated customers gain). VAT proceeds 
increase (that is, the VAT proceeds paid by VAT exempt customers are larger than the VAT 
proceeds previously paid by the NPO on its inputs) and, when weighted by the cost of 
public funds, increase more than the decrease in customers surplus, so that total welfare is 
higher when the NPO is VAT rated than when it is VAT exempt.   
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4.2 Competition with access only 
Some of the results of the NPO offering access entry are similar to those of the monopolist 
NPO. The first two columns of figures in Table 2 show the results of the NPO offering an 
access service to entrants for a VAT exempt NPO. The first column shows the welfare 
maximizing results which for the single-piece and bulk mail N  customers are almost 
identical to those in column 2 of Table 1. However, in this case the NPO’s access service 
leads entrants to undercut the NPO’s bulk mail price for R  customers, as these customers 
are able to recover the VAT charged by the entrant. The VAT charged by the entrant 
cannot be recovered by the N  customers and in this case the entrants’ price exceeds the 
NPO’s bulk mail price. Some of the R  customers’ volumes transfer from the NPO to 
entrants and the lower price offer results in some overall growth in demand. This results in 
a marginal improvement in total consumer surplus and total welfare for the welfare 
maximizing access entry case in column 1 of Table 2 relative to that of the NPO 
monopolist in column 2 of Table 1. 
The second column in Table 2 shows the minimum q  with access entry and the VAT 
exempt NPO. When compared to the third column in Table 1, the results of minimum q  in 
column 2 of Table 2 show higher single-piece and bulk mail prices at 0.480 and 0.420 
respectively. The price ranges within which break-even occurs are slightly narrower in the 
presence of access entry and the difference in total consumer surplus and total welfare 
measures between the minimum q  and welfare maximizing case increase with the access 
entry. The access price at 0.210  in this case is marginally lower than that in the welfare 
maximizing case of column 1 in Table 2. 
The last two columns of figures in Table 2 show the results of the NPO with access 
entry for the VAT rated NPO. The first of these columns shows the welfare maximizing 
results which for the single-piece customers are almost identical to those in column 5 of 
Table 1 for the calibration reported in Section 3. For bulk mail customers, the R  customers 
compare the pre-VAT prices of the NPO and entrants, and the N  customers compare the 
post-VAT prices. In both cases the entrants’ prices are less than the NPO’s prices, and this 
leads to some of the NPO’s volumes for both the R  and N  customers to switch to the 
entrants. In this case, the volumes switching are similar for R  and N  customers, but more 
generally the volume switch is greater where the price difference between NPO and 
entrants is greater. 
 
Result 2 2Changing the VAT status of the NPO from exempt to rated has the same 
qualitative impact under access-based competition as under monopoly: VAT exempt 
customers lose more than VAT rated customers gain, but total welfare increases thanks to 
the increase in (weighted) VAT proceeds. In that sense, the observations summarized in 
Result 1 are robust to the introduction of access-based competition in the postal sector.   
 
 
 VAT exempt NPO VAT rated NPO 
 Welfare 
maximizing
Minimum 
q 
Welfare 
maximizing
Minimum 
q 
Single-piece (λ=0.16)  (λ=0.195)  
Pre-VAT price 0.614 0.480 0.574 0.469 
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Post-VAT 
price 
0.614 0.480 0.689 0.562 
Volume 1.909 2.016 1.848 1.950 
     
Bulk mail      
Pre-VAT price 0.371 0.420 0.359 0.409 
Post-VAT 
price 
0.371 0.420 0.431 0.490 
Volume N15 4.117 3.793 3.528 2.460 
Volume R16 3.643 2.548 3.529 2.639 
     
Entry     
Pre-VAT price 0.369 0.354 0.351 0.349 
Post-VAT 
price 
0.442 0.425 0.421 0.418 
Volume N 0.000 0.172 0.463 1.571 
Volume R 0.633 1.832 0.845 1.768 
     
Access      
Price 0.224 0.210 0.207 0.204 
     
Net VAT 
receipts 
0.221 0.215 0.557 0.527 
Total 
consumer 
surplus17 
6.523 6.459 6.198 6.116 
Welfare 6.810 6.755 6.846 6.758 
Table 2: Allocations with access entry18 
Are these results robust to modifications of the calibration assumptions? We have 
performed the same numerical simulations19 as in Tables 1 and 2 while changing three 
assumptions of the model: decreasing the cost of public funds μ  from 0.3 to 0.2, 
increasing the share of costs subject to VAT (that is, increasing Fα  from 0.4 to 0.5 and Iα  
from 0.2 to 0.3) and finally lowering the VAT rate t  from 20% to 10%. Changing one 
assumption at a time, we obtain the same qualitative features as those exposed in Result 1, 
with one very intuitive exception. When μ  is lower, it is not always the case that total 
                                                 
15 N = non VAT rated or VAT exempt customers 
16 R = VAT rated customers 
17 Both NPO and entrants profits are zero by assumption. 
18 Prices are expressed in €, volumes in billion items, VAT receipts, surplus and welfare in billion euros. 
19 Results available upon request from the authors. 
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welfare is higher when the NPO is VAT rated, since the increase in VAT proceeds is not 
enough to counter-balance the decrease in (VAT exempt) customer surplus. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have looked at the impact of the VAT status of the NPO and customers 
on the optimal pricing of bulk mail, single-piece mail and access. We have developed a 
model where single-piece mail is offered only by the NPO while bulk mail is offered either 
by the NPO alone or by entrants as well. Beyond analytical determination of the optimal 
Ramsey prices we have considered two other pricing rules; namely equiproportional mark-
ups and minimizing single-piece prices. We have calibrated our model and resorted to 
numerical simulations in order to help assess the possible impact of changes in VAT status 
on volumes, consumer surplus and VAT proceeds. 
In our model, the after tax price of the VAT rated NPO increases by less than the full 
amount of the VAT. Further, we have shown that a move from a VAT exempt to a VAT 
rated NPO benefits the VAT rated bulk mail customers and the VAT authority. 
Additionally, a move from a VAT exempt to a VAT rated NPO is detrimental to both the 
non VAT rated bulk mail customers and the single-piece customers and significantly 
increases the single-piece price. Overall the consumer surplus in the postal sector is lower 
in the case of a VAT rated NPO, but this may be offset when the receipts to the VAT 
authority are included and scaled within the total welfare measure. The key issue driving 
relative welfare results is then the cost of public funds. If this cost is high, a higher global 
welfare level is attained with a VAT rated NPO. If the cost of public funds is low, then the 
reduced price for VAT exempt customers makes VAT exempt status for the PO desirable 
from a welfare perspective. 
Sensitivity testing of our calibration values indicates that these results appear to be 
robust to a range of plausible alternative values. Additionally, in a sequel to this paper (De 
Donder et al (2009)) we concentrate exclusively on numerical results (based on the same 
calibration assumptions as here) and we show that the qualitative results outlined in the 
previous paragraphs are robust to the introduction of both the possibility for entrants to 
bypass the incumbent’s delivery network and of a lower VAT rate on single-piece mail. 
Our model does not take account of the potential for VAT rated bulk mail customers to 
create additional business and VAT receipts through reclaiming any VAT on postal 
services and conversely for VAT exempt customers. This could be included in the analysis 
as a further extension. Another area of potential extension includes consideration of a 
budget constraint for government whereby the sum of profit and VAT receipts is the same 
for both the VAT exempt and VAT rated NPO. Hence, there is scope to develop the model 
presented in this paper to explore further the consequences of alternative VAT regimes 
within the postal sector. 
6 References  
Armstrong, M. (2002) “The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection,” in M. Cave et 
al (ed.), Handbook of Telecommunication, Volume 1, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Review of Network Economics                                                                                           Vol.8, Issue 3 – September 2009 
 250
Auerbach, Alan J., and James R. Hines Jr. (2001) “Taxation and Economic Efficiency,” in 
Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (ed.)., Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3, 
North-Holland: Amsterdam. 
De Donder, P. (2006) “Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations,” 
Review of Industrial Organization, 28: 307-326. 
De Donder, P., H. Cremer, P. Dudley and F. Rodriguez (2006) “Pricing and Welfare 
Implications of Alternative Approaches to Setting Price Controls in the Postal Sector,” in 
M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer (ed.), Progress toward Liberalization of the Postal and 
Delivery Sector, Springer: New York. 
De Donder, P., H. Cremer, P. Dudley and F. Rodriguez (2009) “Some Welfare and Pricing 
Implications of Alternative Regimes for Value Added Taxation in Postal Services,” in 
M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer (ed.), Progress in the Competitive Agenda in the Postal 
and Delivery Sector, Edward Edgar: Cheltenham. 
Panzar, J. (2004) “Combining Liberalization and Unbundling Policies in Postal Markets,” 
mimeo, Northwestern University and University of Auckland. 
7 Appendix 
7.1 Optimal pricing formulas with VAT exempt NPO 
We first look at the case where the NPO is VAT exempt. Its total cost of providing x  units 
of single-piece mail, Iy  units of bulk mail and of delivering Ey  units of entrants’ bulk 
mail on their behalf is given by 
 
( , , ) = (1 ) (1 ) ( )
( ) .
I I E I I
N F x
I I I I E
y
C x y y F t t c d x
c d y d y
α α ⎡+ + + +⎣
⎤+ + + ⎦
 
 
Its (net of tax) profit is then given by  
 
( , , ) = ( ) ( , ) ( , )
( ( ), ( , ), ( , )),
I I I I I E E I E
N
I I I E E I E
N
q p a qx q p y p p ay p p
C x q y p p y p p
Π + +
−  
 
where ( , ) = ( , (1 )) ( , )I I E I I E I I EN Ry p p y p p t y p p+ +  and 
( , ) = ( , ) ( , (1 )).E I E E I E E I ER Ny p p y p p y p p t+ +  
 
The (second-best) optimization problem is given by  
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(11)  
, ,
max = ( ) ( , (1 )) ( , )
( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )
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where ( , (1 ))I ENCS p p t+  and ( , )I ERCS p p  are net consumer surpluses when the two 
types of bulk mail products are available at before-tax prices of Ip  and Ep  and where the 
amount of VAT proceeds paid by VAT exempt agents is denoted by  
 
( )
( , , ) = ( ) ( )
( ) ( , (1 )) ( , )
( ( , ) ( , (1 )))
( , (1 )).
I E I I
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The optimality equation for the single-piece mail price is not affected by the presence 
of entrants and is thus given by (2). As for the bulk mail price Ip , its optimal value is 
given by  
 
(12)  
(1 )( )
1 (1 ) 11 = ,
1 1
I I I I
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EI EI
NI I I
y
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where  
( , )/( , )/= and =
( , )/ ( , )/
i I E ji I E j
ij ij k
kj I E j j I E j
y p p py p p p
y p p p y p p p
σ σ ∂ ∂∂ ∂− −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
 
with , { , },i j E I i j∈ ≠  and { , }k N R∈  are called displacement ratios (see Armstrong 
(2002) and De Donder (2006)). 
Comparing with the optimal pricing formula under monopoly (equation (3)), we 
observe two new effects that both concur to increase the optimal Ip . Both terms have to 
do with the displacement of demand from NPO’s bulk mail towards entrants’ bulk mail as 
Ip  increases. The first new effect (second term in the RHS of (12)) corresponds to the 
increase in profit made selling access. The second new effect (last term in the RHS of (12)) 
corresponds to an increase in VAT proceeds as demand shifts towards the final product of 
entrants. Observe that in the latter case, only the demand from VAT exempt customers is 
taken into account. 
The optimal value of the access charge a  is given by the formula 
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(13)  
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The complexity of the formula is due to the fact that the access charge impacts the 
entrants’s bulk mail demand coming both from VAT rated and from VAT exempt 
customers, with different consequences on VAT proceeds and on entrants’s prices. To get 
a better understanding of the formula, we proceed as previously and we assume that the 
NPO posts two different access charges (denoted by Ra  and Na ) to entrants depending on 
the VAT status of their customers. The optimal value for the access charge on the VAT 
rated market, Ra , is given by 
 
(14)  
= (1 ) ( )(1 )
1 1
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where Eiε  is the direct price elasticity of entrants’s bulk mail demand by VAT rated 
( =i R ) or VAT exempt ( =i N ) customers. The optimal access price is composed of three 
components: the delivery cost, a displacement term and the Ramsey mark-up. The intuition 
for these three elements is given in De Donder (2006). The impact of the VAT status can 
be seen in the first two terms. Observe that, if =λ μ , equation (14) boils down to equation 
(1) in De Donder (2006).20 Increasing the cost of public funds results in a decrease in the 
weight put on the part of the marginal costs that is subject to input VAT. 
The optimal value of the access charge on the VAT exempt market, Na , is given by 
(15)  
= (1 ) ( )(1 )
1 1
1 .
1 1
I I IE I I I I
N N y
EN
E
N
a d t p c d t
at tp
λ μ λ μα σ αλ λ
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There are two additional impacts of increasing Na , compared to increasing Ra . First, the 
price paid by entrants’s VAT exempt customers increases by (1 ) Nt a+  rather than by Ra . 
Second, the planner cares about VAT proceeds coming from these VAT exempt customers 
-- but not from VAT rated customers of bulk mail. Observe that the first line of (15) is 
                                                 
20 There is no good D  in the current paper, so the third term in the RHS of equation (1) in De Donder 
(2006) vanishes in our context. 
Review of Network Economics                                                                                           Vol.8, Issue 3 – September 2009 
 253
similar to the first line of (14), while the second line contains two differences. The first 
difference lies in the numerator of the Ramsey mark-up, which goes from λ  in equation 
(14) to tλ μ+  in equation (15). The second difference takes the form of an additional term 
in the formula. The first term in the second line of (15) collapses to the corresponding term 
in (14) only if = 0μ  or if = 0t . The new term in (15) disappears only if = 1μ −  (that is, 
the planner does not care at all for tax proceeds) or if = 0t . As a consequence, the 
formulas (15) and (14) are equivalent only in absence of VAT ; that is, if = 0t . 
Since we assume that the same access charge has to be posted irrespective of the VAT 
status of entrants’s customers, the optimal access charge formula is given by the more 
complex equation (13). 
7.2 Optimal pricing formulas with VAT rated NPO 
We now turn to the case where the NPO is VAT rated. Its total cost is given by 
 
( , , ) = ( ) ( ),I I E I I I I I ER x yC x y y F c d x c y d y y+ + + + +  
 
and its (net of tax) profit is 
 
( , , ) = ( (1 )) ( , ) ( , )
( ( (1 )), ( , ), ( , )),
I I I I I E E I E
R
I I I E E I E
R
q p a qx q t p y p p ay p p
C x q t y p p y p p
Π + + +
− +  
 
with ( , ) = ( (1 ), (1 )) ( , )I I E I I E I I EN Ry p p y p t p t y p p+ + +  and 
( , ) = ( , ) ( (1 ), (1 )).E I E E I E E I ER Ny p p y p p y p t p t+ + +  
 
The Ramsey optimization problem of a VAT rated NPO is given by  
 
(16)  
, ,
max = ( (1 )) ( (1 ), (1 ))
( , ) ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )
such that ( , , ) 0,[Lagrange multiplier: ],
I E
R x NIq p a
I E I I I E
R R R
I I
R
W CS q t CS p t p t
CS p p q p a VAT q p p
q p a
μ
λ
+ + + +
+ + Π + +
Π ≥
 
with  
 
( , , ) = ( (1 )) ( (1 ), (1 )) ( (1 ), (1 )) .I E I I I E E E I ER N NVAT q p p t qx q t p y p t p t p y p t p t⎡ ⎤+ + + + + + +⎣ ⎦  
 
The formula for the optimal single-piece mail price is not affected and still given by 
(2). 
As for the other two prices (access charge and bulk mail price), we proceed as before 
and assume that the NPO can post different prices for VAT rated customers ( , IR Ra p ) and 
for VAT exempt customers ( , IN Na p ). The optimal prices for VAT rated customers are 
given by 
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(17)  = ( ) ,
1
I
I I I EI I R
R y R
R
pp c d a d λσ λ ε+ + − + +  
 
and  
 
(18)  = .
1
I IE I I I R
R R y E
R
aa d p c d λσ λ ε⎡ ⎤+ − − +⎣ ⎦ +  
 
We refer the reader to De Donder (2006) for an in-depth interpretation of these formulas, 
from which tax considerations (including μ ) are absent. 
The optimal prices for VAT exempt customers are given by 
 
(19)  1 1(1 ) = ( ) ,
1 1 1
I
I I I EI I E N
N y N N
N
ptp t c d a d tpμ μ λ μσλ λ λ ε
+ + ++ + + − + ++ + +  
 
and  
 
(20)  1 1= (1 ) .
1 1 1
I E IE I I I N
N N N y E
N
ata d tp p t c dμ μ λ μσλ λ λ ε
+ + +⎡ ⎤+ + + − − +⎢ ⎥+ + +⎣ ⎦  
 
Compared with formulas (17) and (18), equations (19) and (20) are modified in a way now 
familiar to the reader. 
We will also consider the objective of minimizing the single-piece price q  while 
allowing the NPO to break-even. Compared to the optimization program (10), we have an 
additional degree of freedom in the setting of the access charge. We then impose that both 
the access charge and the bulk mail price exhibit the same mark-up m  over marginal 
cost21: 
 
(21)  
min such that ( , , ) 0,
= (1 )( ),
= (1 ) .
I I
i
I I I
y
I
q q p a
p m c d
a m d
Π ≥
+ +
+
 
 
                                                 
21 As in problem (10), we also impose the constraint Iq p k≥ +  that happens to be binding in the results 
reported in section 4. 
